

After the Male Employment Oriented Regime: Dilemmas in Japanese Welfare Reform

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Neoliberal structural reform took place in Japan from the late 90s, particularly after the Koizumi government took office in 2001. Although purse strings were tightened even further, Koizumi's reforms received strong support. At the fall 2005 general election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won by an overwhelming majority, increasing its seats from 212 to 296. Rising poverty levels became apparent, however, with concern increasing about the widening socio-economic disparities. Espousing the campaign theme "Seikatsu Daiichi" (Our daily life is what is most important), the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory at the 2007 Upper House elections under Abe's government, which had continued Koizumi's reforms. The LDP suffered a crushing defeat, securing only 37 of the 64 seats up for re-election. In the summer 2008 cabinet reshuffle, the Fukuda administration distanced itself from party forces supporting Koizumi's reforms and showed a different line of strategy. If pork barrel politics make a return, forces seeking neoliberal reform, including within the DPJ, may regain strength.

So what is behind this intense political oscillations regarding welfare reform in Japan? Why has the Third Way discourse that emerged after neoliberal reform in the UK and the US not taken hold in Japan?

The difficulties of Japanese welfare reform has deeply relate to special characteristics of Japanese welfare and employment regimes and the character of its livelihood security (Osawa, 2007; Miyamoto, 2008). Under this, in a familialistic structure, job security is given to the male breadwinner, and his income supports members of the household. Considering Japan's social spending and the fact that it is a small-scale welfare state, the Japanese welfare and employment regime has relatively well managed to control the socio-economic disparities in Japan. This particular structure, however, has increased distrust in the government and made the alternative Third Way approach difficult.

In this paper, I will first discuss characteristics of the Japanese welfare and employment regimes from a comparative perspective (Part 1). Next, I will touch upon various models for a comparative welfare state analysis from the perspective of gender and specify the location of the Japanese regime (Part 2). Finally, I will look at the process since the 90s of dismantling this regime (Part 3) and explore the resulting difficulties in welfare reform, as well as what lie behind them (Part 4).


1. Japanese Welfare and Employment Regimes

I begin by explaining Japanese welfare and employment regimes since the end of the Second World War.

(1) A small-scale welfare state

The scale of Japanese welfare state has always been small (Figure 1). Even today, welfare spending stands only at around 16% of its GDP, the same as the US. Japan,

however, instituted a universal health insurance and pension system in 1961, although without the larger government spending that would normally be associated with it. It was the fourth country in the world to introduce universal health care(Yoshikawa and Wada, 1999; Hiroi, 1999). Access to medical services improved, despite controls imposed on the scale of medical fees. In terms of care for the elderly, we saw medical services later supplementing the lack of nursing care services.



OECD social expenditure database

(2) Job security in companies for the male breadwinner


Despite being a small-scale welfare state, Japan's Gini coefficient shows that differences in primary income levels are not very wide and are relatively well controlled (Figure 2).

Table 1 Gini Coefficients before and after tax

	Before Tax and Transfers	After Tax and Transfers	Redistribution Rate
Germany(1994)	0.436	0.282	35.3
The U.S. (1995)	0.454	0.344	24.5
Sweden(1995)	0.487	0.23	52.9
Japan(1994)	0.34	0.265	22

Burniaux, et al., 1998.

This is because unemployment rates have been controlled through job protection under the employment regime, which aims for a system that supports the work of as many people as possible - not just due to labor-management relations in large companies, but also due to protection policies affecting employment in small and medium-sized businesses (Miyamoto, 1997; Uzuhashi, 1997). The employment regime in this context indicates a whole range of institutional network for employment including industrial relations, the job security system, labor market policies and economic and industrial policies in general, and in this sense this is a broader concept than the production regime which does not pay strong attention to job creation in peripheral sectors (Soskice, 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001).



U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.

Both Japan and Sweden had low unemployment rates until the 90s (Figure 2), but there are two big differences regarding how the two countries realized the low unemployment rates. Firstly, Japan limited the target of its employment protection to the male breadwinner: through familism, the male breadwinner's income supported the family members. This is different from how unemployment rates are controlled in countries like Sweden, where large-scale public services have supported women in the workplace and achieved a high labor rate for women (LO, 1994). In a remarkable contrast, Japan saw a decrease in the post-war female labor force, making it an exception among industrialized nations (Ochiai, 1994).

Secondly, full employment in Sweden was made possible through active labor market policies, whereby the labor force was moved from low to high productivity sectors (LO, 1951; Hedborg, and Meidner, 1984; see Figure 3). In Japan, however, spending on such policies was low, and the unemployment rate was controlled using various policy methods to secure labor for both low and high productivity sectors (Table 2). For major private companies in sectors with high productivity, stable business with long-term outlook and so called life-time employment became possible through cross-holdings of shares within the corporate group and "Gyosei Shido" (administrative guidance) from the government. The companies also instituted in-house benefits and strengthened the idea of the "family wage" (Miyamoto, 2008).

Table 2 Expenditures for Active Labour Market Policies (1999)

	Japan	Germany	Sweden	U.S.
Public Employment	0.11	0.23	0.28	0.04
Job Trainings	0.03	0.35	0.48	0.04
Youth Programs	n.a.	0.08	0.03	0.03
Subsidized Employment	0.13	0.40	0.45	0.01
Programs for disabled	0.01	0.25	0.57	n.a.
sum	0.28	1.30	1.82	0.15
Passive Programs	0.54	2.12	1.68	0.23

OECD Employment Outlook 2001

At the same time, unlike Swedish Social Democratic Party, Japan's LDP found an important support base in sectors with low productivity, such as primary industries, construction in rural areas and self-owned businesses. Thus, it provided jobs in the construction industry in rural areas through public works, which absorbed the primary industries labor force that would have otherwise become unemployed or flowed into the cities. Expenditures for public work investment have been kept at very high level even after provision of basic social infrastructure had been finished. By stabilizing micro-distribution industries and self-owned businesses through public financing for small and medium-sized businesses and policies to regulate competition among them, it also increased profits in non-competitive industries and protected jobs there(Figure 4).

Figure 3 Employment Regime in Sweden




Figure 4 Employment Regime in Japan





Figure 5 Public investment for domestic fixed capital formation (per GDP)



(3) Focus on social security in later years of life


Because the employment regime became more important than the welfare regime for livelihood security, the limited social security spending tended to be targeted for securities later in life, namely pensions, health care for the elderly and payments for the bereaved (Hiroi, 2006). For social risks in first and middle stage of life, namely child care, unemployment, and retraining, the employment regime was expected to play major role. Figure 5 shows different items of social security spending on OECD classifications, and we can see that spending on pensions,

payment for the bereaved and health care are significant. Considering the fact that 40 percent of health care spending is for elderly people, it means greater part of Japan's social spending goes to people in the later years of life. If we calculate Japan's expenditure per person aged over 65 years, it amounts to 17 times that of those under 65, which is double the OECD average (OECD, 2006).

Focus on social security in the later years of life point to an emphasis on social insurance over family allowances and social services. The employment regime became central to livelihood security, with social insurance divided according to job type, such as public servant, company worker or the self-employed. The corresponding relationship between job security according to job type and divided social security system was further reinforced by development of company based pension like the Employee's Pension Fund (Shinkawa, 2005).

Spending on family policies has been restricted. Familialism certainly exists, but it is supported by benefits provided by the company, such as company housing and the family wage earned by the male breadwinner. This can be contrasted with familialism in conservative regimes, such as in Germany and France, which is supported by social expenditure for family (Korpi, 2000). Also, until the growth in recent years of services such as nursing-care insurance, Japan suffered a lack of public services such as nursing care and daycare (Figure 6).

Figure 6 Social expenditure concentrated among elderly



OECD Social Expenditure Database

(4) The part-time labor market as a consequence

In Japan, the female participation rate by age forms "M." shape. That is to say, many women who leave the labor market for child care return to employment when they need supplementary income for children's university fee and mortgages due to limited public support for education and housing. However, the tax and social insurance systems in Japan are in line with the male breadwinner model, and there is a spouse tax deduction if the wife's income is less than 1.03 million yen, and a special spouse tax deduction if it is between 1.03 and 1.4 million yen. Also, the wives of private company workers or public servants who earn less than 1.3

million yen are exempt from paying the social insurance premium. This system induces housewives to reduce income from part-time work under a certain level.

In other words, because of the size of social expenditure in Japanese welfare state, there is a need to increase labor to supplement the family budget, but because of the male breadwinner model of the welfare state, there is a need to keep the income below a set level. This is how the part-time labor market, with low wages, and mostly joined by female workers in the service industry, has emerged.

2. Positioning the Japanese-style Regime

How does the Japanese-style regime, with all its specificities, compare with others?

It has been considered extremely difficult to put down the Japanese welfare state in the typologies of comparative welfare state study (Esping-Andersen, 1997). In terms of the fact that there are limits to the scale of social security spending, it is similar to the liberal regime of countries such as the US. In terms of familism and the structure of the welfare regime (a occupationally structured social insurance system with differences in qualification level among them), it is similar to a conservative regime, such as Germany. Further, in terms of being able to control the unemployment rate since the 70s, it is similar to the social democratic regime of countries like Sweden.

Thus, if the welfare regime type alone is the criterion by which to judge, the Japanese welfare state shows aspects of discord. However, this can be fully explained by considering its employment and welfare regimes together.

Several of the things that Esping-Andersen has characterized in the welfare regime can actually only be explained in terms of their interaction with the employment regime or production regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ebbinghaus, and Manow, 2001; Iversen, 2005). Sweden has been able to adhere to a high level of decommodification and become a universalist welfare state because the employment regime revolves around active labor market policies that create consistently high employment rates that mesh well with the different kinds of employment-linked income security. The government of the US, which places much emphasis on social assistance, has ultimately not made full employment one of its goals, so its efforts to control social security spending have been to appease taxpayers, whose dissatisfaction has risen because of the growing number of people dependent on social assistance.

Thus, each individual welfare state must be explained in terms of how its welfare and employment regimes are linked. These regimes have diverse aspects to them, however, so it is almost impossible to build a single general model applicable to every interests of research. Through thinking about which characteristics of the welfare and employment regimes to focus on and considering the welfare state from various perspectives, we can envision different types of models. Our focus here is to propose a model that is particularly useful in clarifying the characteristics of the Japanese-style welfare state from the perspective of gender.

Diane Sainsbury, Walter Korpi and Mari Osawa have attempted the reorganization of this typology from a gender perspective, more or less using Esping-Andersen's typology as a base.

Sainsbury classifies the welfare regime under either the male breadwinner model or the individual model, based on whether social insurance, the tax system and social services target the family, headed by the male breadwinner, or the

individual, and, looking also at other factors, attempts a comparative analysis of the welfare state (Sainsbury, 1996).

Korpi presents three types of models: the general family support model, found in countries of Continental Europe, where family policies actively support the family under the male breadwinner model, the dual earner support model of Scandinavian countries, which is completely opposite, promoting individual oriented tax and social security system and improving the work environment for women, and the market oriented model, found in Anglo-Saxon countries, which is passive in both aspects. The problem is Japan's location in this, because it does not fit into the general family support model from the perspective of the amount of social security spending for the family and the scale of its social services. Korpi thus identify Japan as the market oriented model, but from the perspective of strong government involvement in the employment regime, there are still problems in categorizing Japan as market oriented in the same way as Anglo-Saxon countries (Korpi, 2000).

Mari Osawa, on the other hand, adds the male breadwinner model typically found in Japan to market oriented model and dual earner support model. Rather than focusing on the strength of family support as Korpi does, Osawa focuses on labor market regulations and social security system that have prioritized the job security of the male breadwinner. In other words, although apparently similar to Korpi's model, Osawa's model argues for understanding Japan's characteristics by focusing on the employment regime, rather than the welfare regime (Osawa, 2007). Osawa is correct in paying more attention to employment regime to understand Japanese regime, but through this, differences between Japan and Continental Europe as Germany regarding issues such as the size of the welfare state recede into the background.

Adding to difference in strength of family support policy, in Europe, there was a tendency for employment protection to be limited to male core workers protected by corporatist agreements between employers and trade unions. In places like Germany, where the women's labor force rate was also low and employment in the service sector failed to expand, generational change in the labor force was promoted with early retirement being fostered. Esping-Andersen calls this a "Welfare State without Work" (Esping-Andersen, 1996).


In contrast to this, employment protection in Japan reached even male workers in the peripheral labor market through public work investment and the market regulation for small and medium-sized businesses (Miyamoto, 2008; Calder, 1988). Whereas Germany introduced guest workers to its peripheral labor market, such as construction, in Japan, the construction industry was enlarged in order to absorb peripheral labor through public works. However, Japan was weak in providing the family allowances and social services that would fall under Korpi's general family support model. Thus, rather than resulting from government benefits and services, Japan's familialism was supported and reinforced by the family wage of the male breadwinner and benefits provided by the large company, and because public spending for education and housing were controlled, pressure was created for housewives to work to supplement the male breadwinner's income.

This is why, if we look at female participation rates by age, in Germany until the 80s and in Italy today, there has been a tendency for women who leave the labor market for childrearing to leave for good, whereas in Japan, there is a tendency for them to return to the workforce (the so-called "M-curve"). Their work hours and wage levels, however, have been kept down because, firstly, the male

breadwinner oriented tax and social insurance system create disincentive to earn more , and, secondly, the men's long work hours and limited social services make impossible to work longer.

These gender attributes in Japanese welfare and employment regimes must be understood within a two-dimensional model that focuses on attributes of both regimes . We can see this in Figure 7, for example. The horizontal axis shows whether the welfare regime is targeting the family, with the male breadwinner at its center, or the individual. The vertical axis shows the strength of state commitment to fulltime employment in the employment regime.

Figure 7 Location of the Male Employment Oriented Regime



Sweden (dual earner support model) is located in the second quadrant of this two-dimensional model, because it has instituted a welfare regime that targets the individual for participation in the labor market while promoting the employment of both men and women through active labor market policies in its employment regime. In the case of the US, as symbolized in the rejection of the Full Employment Bill by Congress in 1946, the government does not hold responsibility for realizing full employment. Its welfare regime has familialistic characteristics, but if we look at the wage difference between males and females and the percentage of women engaged in management positions, women have relatively more work opportunities open to them (Siaroff, 1994). Thus, the US is located in between the third and fourth quadrants (market oriented model). Germany has a familialistic welfare regime but its institutional commitment to full employment is weak. It is thus located in the fourth quadrant (general family support model). Finally, in Japan, the male breadwinner model is a condition and the government is actively involved in supporting male employment, so it is located in the first quadrant. Let's call this a male employment oriented regime.

3. Transformations of the Male Employment Oriented Regime

Today, the male employment oriented regime is undergoing heavy transition. This is because the system that has made job security possible is coming apart, and the structure supporting the male breadwinner model is becoming unstable.

The structure that makes male breadwinners' job security possible is comprised of regulatory policies providing employment opportunities in sectors with low productivity, such as public work investment and protectionist measures for small and medium-sized businesses. Urban white-collar workers have heavily criticized these policies since the 80s as causing clientelistic influence-peddling to thrive and the deepening of the financial crisis (Yamaguchi, 1993).

To gain the support of urban white-collar workers, the LDP administration consistently advocates administrative reform for small government, but at the same time it also continued public works and the provision of employment in rural areas using ways difficult for critics to detect (Shindo, 1989; Kaneko and Takahashi, 2008). It did this by urging local governments to issue loans and giving subsidies for their repayment. Local government debt thus rose and the funds under the government's investment and loan program, which underwrote the loans, worsened. It is in this context that Koizumi, elected in 2001, declared he would curtail spending for public works costs in general expenditures, as well as dismantle the system of supporting rural independent works through tax allocations.

In other words, whereas Western neoliberalism developed by targeting curtailments to the welfare regime, in Japan, it was the dismantling of the employment regime (Pierson, 1994). How neoliberal reforms targeting the employment regime have come about is described below.

The public works budget under general annual expenditure (including natural disaster relief) was reduced from 8.9853 trillion yen in 1998 to 6.9473 trillion yen in 2007. The reduction in spending for ordinary construction works in prefectural and city governments and municipalities is also notable, particularly regarding costs for independent works, which in the same time period went from 17.0645 trillion yen to 7.6639 trillion yen, showing a nearly 10 trillion yen drop (2007 White Paper on Local Public Finance). June 2000 saw the relaxation of regulations protecting very small businesses, and the abolishment of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law.

The demise of the male breadwinner's employment protections also advanced in major private enterprises. The employer's associations have already made clear, in the 1995 report of the Nippon Keidanren, *Shinjidai no Nihon-teki Keiei* (The New Era of Japanese-style Management), that they will curtail long-term employment practices and the application of in-house benefits. According to Nippon Keidanren's Top Management Survey, the percentage of respondents answering positively to limiting the hire of long-term employees to core positions was less than 10% in 1996, but this rose to 14.8% in 2004. Since 2001, with this shift in strategy, major company restructuring has been underway for bad-debt disposal and the number of non-standard employees being hired has increased.

The number of male full-time employees in private companies employing more than 500 people went from 8.06 million in 1999 to 6.93 million in 2007 (Labor Force Special Survey/Labor Force Survey). In 1999, revisions were made to the Temporary Staffing Services Law that in principle liberalized the types of

dispatched work allowed, which had until then been limited to 26 in number, although some areas such as construction, harbor work and manufacturing remained exempt. The manufacturing industry is no longer exempt as of 2004.

The demise of male job security has occurred in line with efforts towards gender equality. It is symbolic that in 1999, when deregulation of temporary staffing services took place, two major changes were made towards achieving gender equality. First, revisions were made to the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, which prohibits discrimination in recruitment, employment, posting and promotion. Secondly, in June that same year, the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society was submitted to the Diet and unanimously approved. This states that Japan strives for a society “where both women and men shall be given equal opportunities to participate voluntarily in activities in all fields as equal partners in the society, and shall be able to enjoy political, economic, social and cultural benefits equally as well as to share responsibilities.” It also placed a duty on the state and local public bodies to take measures towards realizing this. Article 4 establishes that care should be taken so that social systems and practices have as neutral an impact as possible on this selection of social activities by women and men, and Article 6 promotes the balance of home-related activities and work.

Efforts towards gender equality took place at the same time as the stratification of the labor market. Through curtailments to regular employment and the deregulation of dispatch workers, more and more male and female youth were forced to take on labor at wage levels of the part-time labor market for homemakers. Socio-economic disparities grew among women located in different areas of the labor market. Because Japanese welfare regime focused on social risks later in life, it was extremely weak in covering the risks of low wages and lack of knowledge and skills required for employment that the working generations were experiencing. As a result, relative poverty rates of younger households rose and the Gini coefficient increased (Shirahase, 2006).

Japan's Gini coefficient according to OECD data surpassed the OECD average for the first time at 0.314, as of 2000. The relative poverty rate of the working-age population, aged between 18 and 65, was 13.5%, ranking second after the US out of 17 countries.

4. Dilemmas of Welfare Reform in Japan

If we think about welfare reform, taking into consideration all of the above, Japan's male employment oriented regime is ambiguous in character. First of all, it can be said that Japan has achieved a certain extent of social stability through the provision of jobs. As far as we can tell from the Gini coefficient, this is because it has been able to control the socio-economic disparities relatively well, despite being a small-scale welfare state.

Japanese public opinion is thus quite strongly oriented towards stability and welfare. According to a survey taken by Jiro Yamaguchi and the author in 2007, which used the RDD method over a sample of approximately 1,500 people around Japan, when asked, “Which of the following represents what you think Japan should be striving for,” only 6.7% of respondents replied, “a society that values competition and efficiency, like the US.” “A society that values welfare, like Northern Europe” was the preference of 58.4%, and “a society that values lifetime employment, like Japan used to be” was the choice of 31.5% (Yamaguchi and Miyamoto, 2008).

Evaluation of Koizumi's government for dissolving the employment regime through neoliberal reform is harsh, and 64.9% said that it has only made the socio-economic disparities wider. Asked what Japan should maintain or revive in terms of the Japanese-style system, the most common response at 32.9% was "job security." Further, regarding what needs improvement; the most common response at 36.7% was "strengthening public social security."

Reforms have not taken place in accordance with the will of the people and several problems have emerged. As described below, Japan's welfare reform dilemma can be seen at many levels - in public opinion, party politics and welfare administration.

Firstly, there is strong public distrust in the government. Unlike countries like Sweden, where active labor market policies have been advanced, the job security that has kept Japanese society stable has not been provided as a social right. Through administrative tolerance and pork barrel politics, employment in rural areas in particular had been provided by politicians and the administration as a favor. Public administration in Japan has been distrusted because it is considered defending vested interest structure. There is thus the dilemma whereby although the people favor a welfare society, they do not trust the administration which should support welfare society. Of those who responded in the survey that Japan should strive to be a society that values welfare, like countries in Northern Europe, almost 40% said that administrative expenses should be curtailed in order to fund social security (Yamaguchi and Miyamoto, 2008). It seems that Japanese people want universal welfare state with small government.

Secondly, at the party politics level, both the LDP and DPJ are torn between the people's welfare orientations and their distrust of the government, and are unable to take initiatives towards regime reform. Sweeping neoliberal reform under Koizumi's leadership was launched using distrust in and criticism of the regime, but as far as we can tell from the harsh criticisms detailed above, this line of reform underestimated the people's welfare orientations.

After Koizumi's LDP won the 2005 general elections using the line of structural reform, criticism of the widening socio-economic disparities spread among public opinion and the media, and the DPJ won the 2007 Upper House elections by stressing livelihood security issues in rural areas, particularly regarding individual income security for farmers. As I mentioned in opening this paper, under the Fukuda Cabinet, Japan is moving towards restoring the influence-peddling in public works that was present in the male employment oriented regime. This may have the opposite effect of increasing public distrust in the government even more, and perhaps even strengthening neoliberal forces again.

A third point is that the Third Way thinking emerged in the UK and the US after neoliberal reform - why has this not come to the forefront in Japan? This is no doubt because in its male employment oriented regime, the policy of Welfare to Work is central to Third Way thinking has already been realized to a certain extent. Japan has realized livelihood security through the employment regime, rather than the welfare regime, and the number of welfare-dependant has been under control from the outset.

But it is not as though the Third Way has not impacted Japan at all. In fact, at the welfare administration level, workfare reform, inspired by the UK and the US, has been introduced. Using the key phrases "support for self-reliance," "rechallenge society" and "a society with full participation," the government is

advancing policies that focus on work integration rather than income security. This, however, has failed to produce results.

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has run a program since 2005 to provide support for those receiving social assistance to gain independence, modeled on the UK's "New Deal for Welfare." It is aimed at expanding work opportunities by strengthening collaboration between the social welfare offices and public employment security offices. Also, since 2008, to discourage child-care allowance dependency, benefits now come to a partial halt from the fifth year they are received. In debating these measures, the Central Child Welfare Council's Child Allowance Section referred to welfare reform in the US in 1996, when Aid to Families with Dependent Children was abolished and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families was introduced.

The problem is that target of the 2005 welfare program, section of beneficiaries who have work capabilities, were already being absorbed by the employment regime in Japan. Regarding the time limit imposed for receiving child-care allowances, the government has expressed that it will also make efforts to strengthen work integration programs such as a grant to promote self-reliance, education and training, which will cover 40% of costs for acquiring vocational qualifications. However, the execution rate for most programs by local governments is less than 50%. Another problem is that even if one manages to secure employment, it is extremely difficult to balance work and child-rearing given the wage levels and long hours (Asahi Shimbun, October 22, 2007, morning edition). Non-standard employment has until now served to supplement the male breadwinner's income, and as it expands in the labor market, throwing people into it is causing difficulties for livelihood security.

Ultimately, given the characteristics of Japan's welfare regime to date, an alternative strategy to the Third Way is needed. Key to this is that rather than the "Welfare to Work" approach, reform within the current employment regime is needed. First, there must be a restructuring of the Japanese management method, which has until now only been accessible to the upper stratum of male breadwinners, so that the system is also accessible to women and non-standard workers. Support is needed for the youth so that even if they start their careers with non-standard, low skilled jobs, they are later able to transition to more stable work. Further, we should reexamine the role of public works in supporting rural employment by looking at the situation in countries such as Sweden, where the limits to maintaining full employment through active labor market policies can be observed (Miyamoto, 2006). In doing this, we must consider the potential role of a range of entities, such as social enterprises, that can respond to the diverse needs of local communities, and rid ourselves of politician and construction industry-driven pork-barrel politics.

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